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ABSTRACT 
This article shows the uniqueness of cumulative causation in J. R. Commons’s Institutional 
Economics (IE). It highlights the following three points. First, it establishes causation from 
the perspective that trans-action is maintained as the focus of both institutional change 
theory and value theory. Second, the article views conflict as instances of creativity and 
innovation, that is, momentum for institutional evolution. Conflict is an inexhaustible force of 
co-evolution of the relationships of participants over transactions, value, and the working 
rules that coordinate them. Third, conflict places will in trans-action as the driver of the 
evolution of institution and value. With regard to the evolution presented by IE, this article 
emphasizes that the will performs actively in negotiation, that is, will in trans-action which is 
not standalone authoritative will. Collective action is the regulator of value theory in IE and 
the power that drives collective action is will in trans-action. Thus, cumulative causation in 
IE contains the possibilities that the will in trans-action brings innovative consequences, 
which is institutional evolution. 
 
JEL: B25, P16 
Keywords: J.R. Commons, Institutional Economics, Cumulative Causation, Trans-action, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cumulative causation is an important perspective of  institutional economics [Kapp: 1976]. 
Cumulative causation refers to a change of  factors progressing cyclically and cumulatively 
through reciprocal reinforcement of  the factors. There are two genealogies of  theories of  
cumulative causation. 
In the first genealogy, which is used widely, analytical themes provide the dynamics of  the 
macro economy. This genealogy starts with A. Young [1928] and proceeds to G. Myrdal [1957] 
and N. Kaldor [1966], among others. 
In the second genealogy, analytical themes are the cumulative causation between a society 
and individuals. This focus on causation enables us to treat “cognition,” “volition,” or “choice” 
of  individuals as they are socialized and simultaneously maintain their own singularity, without 
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lapsing into “reductionism” or “totalism” [Bazzoli: 1999, p.128]. T. Veblen is both the 
primogenitor and pioneering figure of  this genealogy [Veblen: 1899]. He formalized cumulative 
causation between “prevalent habits of  thought” (institution) and “instincts” of  humans, which 
explains why industrial technology is directed toward maintaining the “leisure class.” 
  However, we cannot know the role of  “will” or “volition” in either genealogy.1 There is 
nothing wrong with this removal of  will with regard to the first genealogy because its analytical 
level is macro. The pioneering figure of  the second genealogy, Veblen, dared to eliminate will 
from analytical objects. This may be appropriate in an ultra long-term analysis. However, when 
we consider co-evolution of  political and economic behavior, economic value, and institutions, if  
we eliminate the performance of  will from analysis, the theory may lose touch with reality. This is 
because, at least in the short term and mid term, the ingenuity of  actors may influence behavioral 
and institutional change. 
  It is well known that John Rogers Commons (1862–1945), who is said to be one of  the 
founders of  American institutionalism, constructed “volitional economics,” that is institutional 
economics containing volition as an element [Commons: 1927]. However, there are few works on 
the cumulative causation of  “institution” 2  and “institutionalized mind” discussed in his 
masterpiece, Institutional Economics (IE) [Commons: 1934a] [Bazzoli: 1999; Ramstad: 1990; Zingler: 
1974]. These two themes, that is, will and cumulative causation, are not connected appropriately. 
In other words, there is insufficient explanation [Bazzoli: 1999; Zingler: 1974] or inappropriate 
explanation [Ramstad: 1990] in the previous research about how will is placed in the framework 
of  causation in which the political and economic behavior of  actors, economic value, and 
institutions causally circulate and co-evolve. 
  Ramstad [1990] focused on the will of  an “authoritative agency” as a driver of  cumulative 
causation who chooses institutions. Certainly, his opinion is appropriate in a sense but it failed to 
convey the essence of  IE because the will in IE means will performed in social action, that is, will 
in “trans-action.”3 
  By analyzing the explanation of  Ramstad [1990] about cumulative causation, this article 
clarifies the role of  will in the composition of  the co-evolution of  the political and economic 
behavior of  actors, economic value, and institutions. If  we consider the composition of  
cumulative causation in IE while keeping our sights on the will in trans-action, then, the 
uniqueness of  cumulative causation is evident. 
  The rest of  this article is as follows. In Section 2, we critique Ramstad’s [1990] composition 
of  cumulative causation in IE for failing to grasp the will in trans-action. In Section 3, we show 
the role of  will in “trans-action,” that is, the tree type of  “transaction,” which is bargaining, 
                                                   
1 “Will” refers to the total inner world of  an individual. “Volition” indicates active choice, that is, “performance,” “forbearance,” “avoidance,” and 
“timeliness” [Commons: 1934a, p.305-6; 1950, p.149]. This strategic choice, including deliberate “withholding,” is intended to control “proprietary 
scarcity” [Commons: 1934a, pp.198-201]. Timeliness is the choice of  appropriate time and place and degree of  performance. 
2 In IE, institution, collective action, the working rule of  a going concern, and order are different expressions indicating the same meaning. 
3 The reason we use the term “trans-action” [Commons: 1934a, p.73] is to emphasize that it is not related to O. E. Williamson’s transaction-cost 
theory [Williamson: 1986]. Trans-action refers to a communication process. Hereafter, we use the term trans-action and transaction but both 
indicate the same meaning, that is, communication in political or economic activity. 
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managerial, and rationing transaction, or the ultimate unit of  analysis in IE. In Section 4, we 
connect transactions as units, and indicate the composition of  cumulative causation. In Section 5, 
we highlight the uniqueness of  cumulative causation in IE by comparing it to modern 
institutionalism, that is, regulation theory and historical institutionalism. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAUSATION 
 
Ramstad [1990] is the sole work that in some depth discusses circular and cumulative causation 
between individuals and society.4 Ramstad [1990, p.77] asserts that Commons [1934a] contains a 
framework of  circular causation between “institutional causation” and “individual causation” (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 
Circular causation discussed in Ramstad (1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 
Institutional causation means reciprocal relations that follow two directions: first, institutions 
                                                   
4 However, as can be expected from the section title “XVII. A Digression on Institutional Causation,” Ramstad discussed cumulative causation 
within a space constraint [1990, pp.77-86]. 
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(customs and working rules of  going concerns) cause transactions and economic outcomes; 
second, the outcome is a cause on which the perpetuation of  each institution depends. 5 
Individual causation refers to reciprocal relations between experiences and will. The experiences 
that come from the outside world are the causes of  “meaning,” “valuing,” and “choice” in the 
inner world. These internal activities result in actions,6 which are conductive of  the next 
experiences [Commons: 1934a, p.95; cf., Dewey: 1929, pp.167-8]. In individual causation, the 
inner and outside worlds are not divided but interlinked at an interconnection point, namely, 
action [Albert and Ramstad: 1997; Costa and Castro Caldas: 2011, p.675; Dewey: 1922; Harter: 
1963, p.227]. 
Institutional causation and individual causation are connected by two links: “customary practices 
shape the will” and “the will chooses outcomes/working rules” [Ramstad: 1990, p.79]. The 
former link indicates that expectations, purpose, ways of  recognition, and ways of  action 
converge, to some extent, to a certain type. When we designate this link as our starting point, 
institutional causation becomes the “cause” of  individual causation because institutional 
causation is expressed in the expectations and purpose of  individuals [cf., Biddle: 1990a, p.3]. 
Commons borrowed the term “institutionalized mind” from E. Jordan to express the will 
internalizing institutional causation [Commons: 1934a, p.697, n°72; Jordan: 1927]. 
 The latter link, namely, “the will chooses outcomes/working rules,” is the “volitional 
dimension of  action directed to the achievement of  future end” [Ramstad: 1990, p.80]. Ramstad 
focused on volition of  “authoritative agency” (especially, courts of  law), that is, purpose.7 The 
authoritative agency chooses new working rules to fit with the purpose that is the cause of  action. 
The “purposeful thought” and the choice resting on the thought are “artificial selection” and a 
cause of  institutional causation [cf., Ramstad: 1994, pp.109-11]. 
 Thus, individual causation and institutional causation form a circular ring by these two links. 
“If  one is to understand why an individual has acted in the way he/she has been observed to act, 
one must evaluate the significance in the particular case of  both ‘volition’ (‘individual causation’ as 
captured by the term ‘methodological individualism’) and ‘working rule and custom’ (‘institutional 
causation’ as captured by the term ‘determinism’)” [Ramstad: 1990, p.97, n°54].8 
 Ramstad [1990] asserts that the essence of  Commons’s institutional economics is to 
understand economic values in circular causation. On one hand, in mainstream economics, “the 
wills of  individuals, as limited by their own endowments of  resources and the state of  technology, 
are jointly the basic ‘force’ underlying, or fundamental ‘cause’ of, observed economic values” 
[Ramstad: 1990, p.83]. On the other hand, in Commons’s theory, if  we dare to set a starting point 
                                                   
5 Following law or causation is involved in institutional causation. According to Ramstad, this is the law of  supply and demand, that is, “economic 
law.” According to Uni [2013], it is the cumulative causation of  the macro economy. Based on Ramstad [1990], for Commons, “economic law” or 
“market force” arises from myriad transactions, which are controlled by institutions; therefore, the law does not exist prior to institutions and does 
not evolve independently from the institutions. However, this article focuses only on the causation between “institution” and “institutionalized 
mind” within “multiple causations” [Commons: 1934a, p.7]. 
6 A brilliant explanation of  the relationship between meaning, valuing, and volition is given in Commons [1934a, pp.17-20; cf., Mirowski: 1988, 
p.127). 
7 The purpose of  authoritative agency derives from the collective will of  principals. 
8 Italic font indicates a direct quotation, whereas bold font indicates emphasis by the author of  this article. [ ] is a supplement of  the author. 
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or cause, it is the purpose that the authoritative agency has. According to this purpose, the agency 
“chooses outcomes/working rules.” “Orderly transactions” based on the “adopted working rules” 
realize economic values [Ramstad: 1990, p.85, Figure 2]. Thus, the realized economic values are 
seen as a consequence of  economic coordination. 
 Supporting this “reinterpretation of  the etiology of  economic values” means following two 
points [Ramstad: 1990, p.87]. First, the amendment of  working rules becomes a way to enforce 
economic values that come closer to public purposes than economic values realized under the old 
rules. Working rules are evaluated and reformed based on gaps between public purposes and 
economic values, which are raised by transactions based on the rules [cf., Biddle: 1990b, p.31]. 
Second, an issue that economists should address is redefined, from defining the goals that 
principals or authoritative agents other than economists ought to pursue, to “showing how the 
existing structure of  working rules must be altered if  the evolving purposes of  the principals’ 
collective will are to be attained” [Ramstad: 1990, p.87]. Therefore, economists should first 
investigate the meaning of  public purpose created historically in cumulative causation before 
thinking about the instrument to attain the purpose.9 Adding to Ramstad [1990], this method of  
investigation differs completely from that which considers prescription fitting a given cause, that 
is, an a priori purpose. 
  We indicate the following point counter to this explanation of  Ramstad [1990]. The point 
of  view in which individual causation and institutional causation are units of  cumulative 
causation ignores the uniqueness of  IE in drawing the politico-economic system from 
“transactions,” rather than individuals or the whole society (for emphasis, “trans-action”). Because 
the analytical starting point of  Ramstad [1990] is placed in individual causation, with regard to 
the will, the volition of  authoritative agency is stressed. However, the will in IE means 
“will-in-action” [Commons: 1934a, pp.89, 640], or, to state it clearly, “will in trans-action.” The 
will performs in negotiation in each transaction. 
  Because Ramstad [1990] does not begin his analytical starting point with trans-action, “social 
relations” contained in each transaction, that is “conflict,” “mutual dependence,” and “order” do 
not emerge [Commons: 1934a, pp.57-8, 92, 108]. Then, what is the momentum that makes 
humans reconsider institutions and their habitual assumptions? Ramstad [1990] mainly focuses 
on “doubt” arising when an unintended consequence occurs, in other words, the motivation that 
wants to raise the efficiency of  a “means” for a certain “end.” However, that is not enough 
because, in the line of  Vögelin [1995, p.262], the uniqueness of  IE is that it focuses on “conflict” 
as a momentum of  the “collective investigation” of  actors [Commons: 1998, p.326]. 
 
 
                                                   
9 When Commons discussed whether draft laws would be effective for certain problems, he considered not only the drafting of  the law but also 
the existing or attainable belief  systems of  participants of  transactions that would become norms at a meta-level, supporting the operation of  the 
draft. His view, that it is the norms at meta-level that underpin the workableness of  institutional reform, is expressed clearly in his key word 
“administration.” His method, in which he processes reasoning based on existing or attainable customs, differs completely from the method of  
economists who deduce from certain assumptions that are not based on experiences [Commons: 1934a, p.847]. 
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3. ROLE OF WILL IN TRANSACTIONS 
 
3.1. BARGAINING TRANSACTION 
A “bargaining transaction” is a transaction between equal participants in law over “proprietary 
scarcity.” The proprietary scarcity is a collective and objective value arising by joint expectation, 
which is the transaction, under the control of  law. This means “price” measured by money. It 
depends on so many different factors, that is, institution of  ownership, efficiency in output, 
desired output quantity, coercion, and persuasion in a certain place and time. However, the 
“measure” of  value is only money; it is not nature, labor-pain, labor-power, or the pleasure or 
pain of  individual psychology. Therefore, “scarcity” in IE is distinguished from physical and 
objective scarcity or physical and individual scarcity in previous economic theories. 
Commons indicated that previous economists, that is, J. Lock, F. Quesnay, A. Smith, T. R. 
Malthus, and D. Ricardo, became entrenched in the “substance” of  value. In their theories, “real 
value” diffed from “nominal value” based on the substance of  value, that is, stable measures, in 
other words, labor and utility. However, property rights that had been extended from “corporeal 
property” to “incorporeal property” and “intangible property” were eliminated from the real 
value.10 If  we analyze extended property rights, the “nominal value” itself  is the sole analytical 
object as “institutional value.” Compared to classical economics, which eliminates price 
fluctuations, Commons thought that such fluctuations were “real” and affected the everyday 
economic life of  various actors. In what follows, the term “value,” that is, proprietary scarcity, is 
not what some substance itself  realizes as value but is “price” decided collectively, reflecting the 
five principles of  scarcity, efficiency, custom, sovereignty, and futurity in a certain trans-action 
[Nakahara: 2015]. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that transaction value consists of  “reproduction 
cost” or “marginal utility” [Commons: 1934a, p.175, Chart 4, pp.180-1]. 
 Hereafter, we see how the will in trans-actions, conflict, and collective action are involved 
with bargaining transactions. 
Commons assumes two buyers and two sellers in his “formula of  bargaining transaction” 
[Commons: 1934a, p.59] for the following two reasons. First, as we see later in this section, he 
wanted to treat issues of  reasonable discrimination, competition, and control of  the degree of  
discrimination and competition by sovereignty as considerations of  economic theory. This is 
value theory in the era of  big business. Second, he wanted to express active choice of  “finite 
human will” in transactions [Commons: 1934a, p.318]. According to [Commons: 1934a, p.320], 
the human being is not “an infinite being” who “can enjoy all possible alternatives at the same 
time and place.” Cognizing the best opportunity and the second best opportunity, which are 
immediately executable opportunities in a certain transaction, the human will only chooses from 
the two alternatives. For example, from the standpoint of  B in Figure 2, the practical 
opportunities among infinite opportunities are $110 of  S and 120$ of  S1. 
                                                   
10 With regard to the extension of  property rights, that is, evolution of  the institution of  property, see Tsukamoto [2015]. 
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Figure 2 
Formula of bargaining transaction 
 Economic Relations 
Buyers (bid) ＄100 B Competition 
(Opportunity) 
B1 ＄90 
Bargaining Power (Economic Power)・Moral Power   Power   
Sellers (asked) ＄110 S Competition 
(Opportunity) 
S1 ＄120 
Source: author, based on Commons [1927] ch. I, p. 15 and Commons [1928] r. 12, s. 762 
 
On the side of  B, “higher outgo avoided,” that is, “dis-opportunity-value” [Commons: 1934a, 
pp.312-3] is $10, which is $120 of  S1 minus $110 of  S. In this case, the “volition” of  B is to avoid 
higher expenditure, that is, the choice of  the two opportunities. On the other side, the 
“opportunity-cost” of  S [Commons: 1934a, p.308] is $10, which is $100 minus $90 of  B1. 
According to Commons, this “theory of  dis-opportunity-value and opportunity-cost” was a 
conventional way of  thinking about the value of  courts and businessmen in his era. As we see 
soon in this subsection, courts judge disputed bargaining transactions. This means that 
sovereignty attempts to regulate the bargaining transactions under the worldview of  the theory 
of  dis-opportunity-value and opportunity-cost. Courts investigate transactions similar to the 
disputed transaction, and then, explore whether the dis-opportunity-value in disputed 
transactions is similar to the dis-opportunity-value of  other buyers in similar situations, or 
whether the opportunity-cost in the disputed transactions is similar to opportunity-cost of  other 
sellers in similar situations [Commons: 1934a, p.330]. If  the cases are similar, the considered 
dis-opportunity-value or opportunity-cost is reasonable. However, if  the cases are dissimilar, the 
value or cost is judged to be unreasonable, and therefore, are objects for correction. Such 
judgments, of  course, become rules for future bargaining transactions. 
As an aside, we set transaction value as $ x. $ x is the gross income of  S and gross 
expenditure of  B. This means that in any transaction value, the two interests of  gross income of  
S and gross expenditure of  B are always in conflict. However, this apparently commonplace 
conflict is eliminated from classical economics because it makes an individualistic assumption 
that “we seek the largest possible net income regardless of  the effect on other people” 
[Commons: 1934a, p.323]. When we see economic activity as trans-action, it is brought into sharp 
relief  that arbitration by collective action and negotiation is needed to enable transactions and 
reach settlements. 
We can see more concretely that collective action and negotiation relate to bargaining transaction 
as follows. Bound between the upper limit of  the amount asked of  the seller ($120) and the lower 
limit of  the buyer’s bid ($90) is a “limit of  coercion” [Commons: 1934a, p.331]. Sovereignty sets 
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this limit by legal control, and the amount has been changed in successive periods. Legal control 
has been exerted over the following two issues. First, “discrimination” is settled when the prices 
asked by S of  B and B1 are different. Second, “competition” is regulated to locate it midway 
between destructive competition and monopoly. To be specific, in addition to the conservative 
regulation of  unjustly high asking prices of  sellers (regulation to S and S1 in Figure 2), the 
regulation of  competition contains the regulation of  price dumping of  buyers (regulation to B 
and B1).  
Now, suppose that “fair competition” and “equal opportunity” are completed [Commons: 
1934a, p.63]. Nonetheless, based on Figure 2, there is a gap between the asking price of  S and the 
bid of  B. In this situation, negotiation becomes important. Negotiation consists of  first, 
“coercion” based on economic “bargaining power” and second, “persuasion” based on “moral 
power.”11 Bargaining power is enhanced by collective action. Sovereignty attempts to accomplish 
the “equality of  bargaining power” by approving or regulating the action. When a transaction is 
concluded based on persuasion, the transaction falls within the bounds of  reasonableness. At the 
same time, Commons thought that it is impossible to accomplish complete equality of  bargaining 
power. In this way, in contrast to the common economic theory, in which income and 
expenditure are balanced in production cost, reproduction cost, or marginal utility on condition 
of  free competition, Commons thought that transaction value is decided by coercion and 
persuasion within the bounds of  immediately executable opportunities. 
From our discussion of  bargaining transaction, we can grasp the elements of  the value 
theory of  IE. The elements are the following three points. First, “cause,” “regulator,” and 
“measure” of  value are collective action, including money as institution. In the classic theories 
prior to Commons, why were labor power, labor pain, psychological pleasure and pain, natural 
law, among other factors, set as cause, regulator, and measure of  value? Commons thought this 
was because of  historical demands and because the majority of  people were starting to recognize 
the persuasive force of  the theory [Commons: 1934a, p.197]. However, it does not mean that 
Commons eliminated labor and utility from his value theory. Commons viewed them not as 
substances of  value but as components of  value. 
Second, the historical evolution of  the definition of  proprietary scarcity, which refers to the 
evolution of  property rights from corporeal property to intangible property, is seen as the 
evolution of  collective actions, which include changing business customs, changing working 
rules of  private concerns, and the accumulation of  the novel decisions of  courts. 
Third, the will relates to the genesis of  value; it chooses opportunities and performs in 
negotiation. Again, in bargaining transaction, negotiation means coercion and persuasion. 
However, we should continue to focus on the core features of  this unfamiliar value theory. 
In addition to the collective actions, the core features include social relationships, which involve 
conflict, mutual dependence, and order. If  we capture the relationships, the starting point of  
                                                   
11 Intangible property contributing to persuasion is “good-will.” Examples are “good credit,” “good reputation,” and the “industrial good-will” of  
wage earners to their employers [Commons: 1934a, p.82]. These are moral relationships on the other side of  transaction. 
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value theory cannot be substance of  value, goods, individuals, and exchange, but transaction. We 
do not presuppose that a stable substance of  value really exists, which means that there is no 
equilibrium that is deduced automatically from the assumption, and the value varies under the 
influence of  evolving institutions and changing social, political, and economic situations. 
Therefore, the value theory of  IE is connected directly to the policy implication that the 
politico-economic world needs coordination by private and public collective actions in order to 
realize stable values [cf., Commons: 1934a, p.214, Kitagawa: 2014c]. 
 
3.2. MANAGERIAL TRANSACTION 
Managerial transaction is the horizontal relationship of  “command” and “obedience” inside 
product organization over “efficiency.” Broadly speaking, to take the example of  a firm, on the 
one side, bargaining transactions are external affairs; on the other side, managerial transactions 
are the relationships of  superiors and inferiors. Efficiency means “the rate of  output per unit of  
[labor] input, the man-hour” [Commons: 1934a, p.259]. Each managerial transaction contains three 
social elements: advancement of  technology [Commons: 1934a, p.294]; development of  
managerial skill;12 and change of  sovereign control over the “extent of  authority” from a legal 
superior to a legal inferior. [Commons: 1927, ch.I, p.26]. 
Of  course, in addition to these social elements, will in trans-action is an important factor of  
managerial transaction. In managerial transaction consisting of  command and obedience, what 
kind of  negotiation emerges? In considering this question, the “negotiation” of  Commons may 
mean general communication relating to economic activities. In managerial transactions, 
examples involve “directing” in order to operate subordinates effectively, “teaching” to establish 
the understanding of  goals, means methods, and “inducing” [Commons: 1927, p.67]. These 
ingenuities of  the superior in communication cannot exist without subordinates. The reason 
Commons spoke of  ingenuities may be because he had confidence that the establishment or 
promotion of  relationships of  trust between management and labor, that is “industrial 
good-will”, provides strong benefits for promoting efficiency and social order [Commons: 1934a, 
p.82]. We strongly assert that, also in managerial transaction, the generation of  the value of  
efficiency is related to negotiation between participants, that is, communication between humans. 
In summary, the generation of  efficiency is related to the technological situation in a certain time 
and place, collective actions, and negotiation between participants. 
Now, how do the proprietary scarcity discussed in Subsection 3.1 and efficiency in this 
subsection relate to each other in a given going concern and the whole politico-economic system? 
A hint is provided in the following question and answer of  Commons relating to government 
and efficiency. 
 
The question of  public policy, then, is the question of  Reasonable Value: Should his 
                                                   
12 Examples of  managerial skills include the scientific management of  F. Taylor focusing on Commons [1934a, p.67] and, in the modern world, 
human resource management [cf., Murakoshi and Yamamoto: forthcoming]. 
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largest selfish gain and least loss to self  be secured for him, by the banking system, as a 
producer, or as a seller, or as a buyer, or as an ultimate consumer? (…) The answer to the 
political and ethical question would be then seem to be, Every person seeking his purely 
selfish increase of  profits or wages should get his largest gain as a producer through 
increasing his efficiency, not as a seller gambling on the rise of  prices, and not as a buyer 
gambling on the fall of  prices [Commons: 1934a, pp.799-800]. 
 
From this quotation, we can understand two principles of  efficiency and scarcity as a 
combined challenge to sovereignty, not as distinct challenges. From the standpoint of  
government, legal control targets the compositeness of  the two principles. If  we generalize this 
case, collective actions, whose aim is the coordination of  scarcity, contain actions that also 
consider the coordination of  efficiency. 
Hereafter, bearing in mind that Commons defined reasonable value as “a concept of  
collective action in terms of  money,” we focus on proprietary scarcity, that is, price [Commons: 
1934a, p.207]. Nevertheless, both scarcity and efficiency are factors that determine the value 
expressed by money because they are mutually related. 
 
3.3. RATIONING TRANSACTION 
Rationing transaction is the establishment or revision of  the “working rule” of a sovereign, 
economic, or cultural going concern (e.g., government, firm, trade union, church, or family). 
Rationing transaction is, for example, taxation, fiscal or financial policy, labor management 
contracts, trade agreements, and the bylaws inside firms. In relation to bargaining and managerial 
transactions, rationing transaction is the decision, agreement, or compromise to coordinate the 
bargaining and managerial transaction institutionally of  a certain going concern or concerns. The 
“order” in IE relates to a continuously improving dynamic working rule. The going concern is a 
bundle of  the three kinds of  transactions. 
The process of  negotiation toward agreement is the process of  collective investigation. 
Commons saw consequence as an “ethical ideal type,” which means what the future “ought to be,” 
that is, an ethical goal. This is an investigational process found in existing practices and 
recognized collectively as workable [Commons: 1934a, p.743]. This ideal type provides certain 
futurity, that is, expectations of  gains or losses in future, to members of  going concerns. We may 
say that formulation of  an ethical ideal type is the challenge to constitute actively and 
deliberatively a collective expectation, that is, a state, firm, or cartel. Creative performance of  will 
in trans-action should be noted as this active constitution of  the joint expectation. The 
performance of  will, which attempts to gain a foothold when the challenge arises of  undertaking 
an action in the here and now, creates imaginable order out of  a chaotic future. 
Based on this collective investigation, we find strong belief  by Commons in collective 
wisdom in the background of  his interest on institutional change [Commons: 1913, ch.1; 1998, 
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p.326].13 
 
(…) [M]ethods [of  administration] are to be contrasted with those of  individual 
investigators. Never can an individual investigator be found who can accurately be 
distinguished as both an extremist and reasonable within the extremes. Hence this kind of  
investigation is a collective investigation by all participants, typified by a staff  of  
statisticians, and only a spirit of  toleration makes it practicable to obtain willingness to 
cooperate by hearing and giving “due weight” to all augments and all participants in the 
collective action which always requires concessions on all sides. (…) These methods of  
reasoning and investigation are true also of  all people and not limited to expert 
statisticians and economists. They are the plain everyday logic of  looking for 
similarities and differences; of  choosing between accessible alternatives; of  avoiding 
extremes by joining with others in looking for what is reasonable somewhere between the 
extremes [Commons: 1998, p.326]. 
 
His confidence in wisdom is certainly not in individual wisdom but in collective wisdom. 
This is clear for the following two reasons. First, IE is based on pragmatism, which discusses the 
improvement of  science or rules focusing on trans-action [Commons: 1934a, p.153]. Second, IE 
is based on a Malthusian understanding of  human beings. Humans are not rational beings, but 
beings of  passion and stupidity. This is the reason why coercion and persuasion of  governments 
and customs are justified [Commons: 1934a, pp.702-3]. 
 
 
4. COMPOSITION OF CUMULATIVE CAUSATION IN 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
4.1. MECHANISM OF CUMULATIVE CAUSATION 
 
By connecting the ultimate units of  cumulative causation, that is, bargaining, managerial, and 
rationing transactions, we can provide the full composition of  cumulative causation.14 Based on 
this framework shown in Figure 3, we can clarify the concerted evolution of  transactions, prices, 
and collective way of  thinking and behavior. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
13 This finding belongs to Takao Tsukamoto (Nihon University, Japan). 
14 It is clear that this causation is “cumulative” because institution, that is, working rule, is the “production of  cumulative change” [Mitchell: 1937, 
p.339]. This cumulative production is not unambiguous but is an object of  meaning by present actors, depending on their future aims. A typical 
example is the mechanism of  making decisions by common law courts. 
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Figure 3 
Mechanism of cumulative causation in Institutional Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Capital letter words areas  instructed from IE. 
 
Source: author, based on IE. 
 
 
Bargaining transactions are performed in markets and managerial transactions are performed 
inside going concerns. One part of  rationing transactions regulates the two sorts of  transaction. 
This is “regulations to transactions at micro level.” Another part of  rationing sets the 
“mechanism of  distribution of  macro and mezzo levels,” in particular, “taxation, fiscal, and 
financial policy” and “rationing transactions of  private concerns.” The three sorts of  transactions 
compose the politico-economic system through mutual relating, that is, through complement or 
constraint. The dynamics of  integration of  a myriad transactions, that is, “joint expectations” in 
monetary terms, is expressed by “widespread general price changes,” for example, wholesale price 
indexes, debt, and tax [Commons: 1934a, pp.122-4]. 
The whole concept of  proprietary scarcity contains the following two features. First, there 
are unintended consequences for participants. This emerges inevitably because the whole concept 
of  scarcity is a product of  multiple causation, that is, it is a product of  complexity [Commons: 
1934a, p.7]. Second, proprietary scarcity includes “reasonable value and unreasonable value” 
[Commons: 1934a, pp.62-3] Reasonable value indicates not a certain consequence but a 
consequence of  transactions that comply with certain conditions, namely, “equality of  
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opportunity,” “fair competition,” “equality of  bargaining power,” and “due process of  law” 
[Commons: 1934a, pp.62-3]. These conditions are not given assumptions but goals to reach by 
collective action. Therefore, it cannot be said that the whole concept of  proprietary scarcity 
expresses reasonable value. 
From the viewpoints of  participants, the whole concept of  proprietary scarcity is the 
compression of  unintended consequences, expressed by money in the following five principles: 
scarcity, efficiency, custom, sovereignty, and futurity. The reduced expression, which is 
recognizable to participants, provides a clue to investigate collectively the next institutional 
coordination, that is, rationing transactions. 
This possible consequence is a cue for members of  sovereign, economic, or cultural 
concerns to start collective investigation because a purpose of  gathering members is to provide 
greater freedom and secure expectations and equality, both inside and outside the concern. To do 
so, they need to reconstitute their collective hypothesis relating to their way of  perceiving things, 
their mode of  behavior, and their way of  collective regulation. In other words, a doubt for a 
habitual assumption and an existing institution become a trigger to reconstitute assumptions and 
institutions through collective investigation.  
Not only doubt but also conflict triggers collective investigation. All transactions, that is, 
trans-actions are targeted by IE, contain conflicts between participants. Conflicts awaken the 
participants to their common or differing worldviews or interests, which were previously out of  
their consciousness. When negotiations reach agreements, sometimes the agreement is like to be 
a “compromise,” while at other times, the agreement may be a “synthesis.” The latter type is a 
consequence that results from a redefinition of  interests or a radical change of  the worldviews of  
participants [Commons: 1934a, p.101; Mead: 1934; Albert and Ramstad: 1998].  
This is the negotiation in which the will performs actively. The reason is not only that 
negotiation is the process of  clash of  economic and moral powers of  the participants but also 
because in negotiation, it is possible to overcome dilemmas through mutual understanding and 
mutual transformation of  participants. By establishing novel ways of  regulation or distribution, as 
just described, it sometimes occurs that the selves of  the participants are redefined. Modern 
research, which sets “actors” and “institutions” as two ultimate unit of  analysis and attempts to 
connect actors and institutions, cannot grasp the redefinition of  selves in the negotiation process 
[Boyer: 2004; Denzau and North: 1994; Mahoney and Thelen: 2010; Streeck: 2009]. In IE, the 
creativity and innovation inhabit the relationship between humans but modern research never 
grasps this point [Commons: 1934a, p.153; Herrigel: 2010]. 
The result of  collective investigation, rationing transactions, is that the working rules of  
regulations for transactions and of  distribution at macro and mezzo levels are changed. In other 
words, changes occur to the way in which collective actions coordinate bargaining and managerial 
transactions and values that are consequences of  the transactions. According to the normative 
discussion in IE, one of  the aims pursued by going concerns with sovereign concerns at the top 
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is coordination based on persuasion and inducement and not based on “oppressive, confiscatory, 
or exploitative” coercion [Commons: 1934a, pp.4, 672, 706]. This aim is important because, it is a 
requirement for generating reasonable value that bargaining and managerial transactions are 
undertaken not under coercive regulations but under persuasive regulations. Where this renewed 
collective action relates to transactions as regulators of  value, they should be renewed 
continuously for subsequent transactions. 
In this manner, transactions, prices, and ways of  institutional coordination change in mutual 
relationship. The active driver of  this evolution is the will, which is awoken by conflict and doubt. 
When we refer to causation, it means the concerted evolution of  myriad horizontal and 
hierarchical relationships between participants in collective investigation and transactions. Into 
the middle of  causation is injected proprietary scarcity, which is a reduced expression of  
compromises, synthesis, and uncertainty. According to the normative perspective of  IE, 
“freedom, security of  expectation, equality” of  institutionalized mind and the persuasive 
propensity of  the regulator of  value, which is collective actions, are increasing (see Figure 3: 
“More Freedom, Security of  Expectation and Equality” and “From regulation based on Coercion 
to one based on Persuasion”). 
 
4.2. MECHANISM OF COLLECTIVE INVESTIGATION 
As seen in Section 3, all transactions involve negotiation. In IE, the negotiation process can be 
seen as a process of  “collective investigation” if  we highlight the dimension of  the search 
process of  behavioral hypothesis and purpose. As Commons explained at great length in chapter 
II (I) “John Locke” in IE, a participant is not a “molecule” driven by powers of  the external 
world; rather, participants are “active organizers” [Commons: 1934a, p.153] who give original 
meaning to their environment and consequence of  trans-actions. Therefore, institutional totality 
embracing participants structuralizes the trans-actions; in parallel, the participants reinterpret the 
institutional totality through collective actions. In this world, proprietary scarcity is an 
intermediary connecting the institutional totality and participants. 
We now clarify the role of  will as an active driver in cumulative causation by closely 
analyzing collective investigation. In doing so, we should not forget that no economic trans-action 
or collective investigation is ever without a social relationship, that is, a conflict of  interest. 
  The buildup of  trans-actions, in other words, the consequences of  myriad transactions, is 
expressed conclusively as proprietary scarcity. Specifically, it is debt, tax, or prices of  goods and 
services [Commons: 1934a, p.122]. As discussed in Section 2, this value contains various 
elements: five principles, that is, scarcity, efficiency, futurity, custom, and sovereignty; 
consequences that was intended and no intended at the time of  the trans-actions, that is, security 
or insecurity of  expectations, expansion or shrinkage of  freedom, and equalization or growing 
inequality; and compromise or synthesis of  economic conflict. Because proprietary scarcity, into 
which these various elements are compressed, must contain unintended consequences, it casts 
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doubt on the collective behavioral hypothesis of  participants. 
In IE, humans are conventionalized beings, and at the same time, have the ability to review 
customs carefully. They give meaning to the external world based on their habitual assumptions 
and continue to take action. However, when doubt and conflict arise, the habitual assumptions, 
which had not surfaced to the conscious mind previously, should be recognized and become the 
targets of  reflection. Instead of  faulty habitual assumptions, a new collective habitual hypothesis 
and purpose are constructed deliberatively. In this collective reasoning, two ways of  reasoning are 
performed, “rationalization” and “insight.” Rationalization is a way of  rigorous reasoning, such 
as deduction or induction. It is divided into “analysis” and “genesis.” The former is a process of  
classification. The latter is an analysis of  change of  the classified parts. Insight is, like the way of  
reasoning of  Peirce’s “hypothesis,” “the union of  analysis and genesis into a formula of  the 
changing relations of  the parts to the whole” [Commons: 1934a, p.99]. Insight, rationalization, 
and habitual assumptions comprise the institutional mind. These are, in fact, inseparable; 
however, they are separated for analytical convenience [Commons: 1934a, p.747]. This reasoning 
driven by conflict and doubt is an active performance of  will. We emphasize that creativity and 
innovation in IE is not an attribute of  human beings but an attribute of  trans-action. 
 
Figure 4  
Mechanism of continuous collective investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Capital letter words are as instructed from IE. 
 
Source: author, based on IE. 
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way of  continuous collective investigation (see Figure 4). 
 
 
5. UNIQUENESS OF CUMULATIVE CAUSATION IN 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
5.1. TRANS-ACTION AS ULTIMATE UNIT 
A characteristic of  Commons’s cumulative causation is that the “ultimate unit” composing the 
causation is trans-action [Commons: 1934a, p.4]. When we understand this characteristic, it is 
inappropriate to apply familiar categories to it, namely, methodological holism [Aglietta: 1976] or 
methodological individualism (neoclassical economics), that is, micro-, mezzo-, or macro-level 
analysis. The trans-action is not an individual or institution but a relation itself between citizens, 
between citizens and going concerns, and between concerns. The trans-action exists ubiquitously 
at all analytical levels, that is, micro, mezzo, and macro levels. Moreover, IE does not insist on a 
problem establishment in which a micro-foundation is required for macroeconomics . The 
analytical starting point is neither micro (assumptions about the individual) nor macro (holism), 
but trans-actions. Therefore, cumulative causation in IE becomes far removed from the 
viewpoints of  the following two works. First, Boyer [2004] provided the micro foundations for 
regulation theory by employing P. Bourdieu’s concept of  “habitus.” Second, Veblen [1899] viewed 
the dialectic of  instinct as the driving force of  the evolution of  the socio-economic system. 
Therefore, Hodgson [2003], which criticized IE for lacking a consideration of  instinct that 
should be at the core of  cumulative causation, did not understand at all Commons’s unique 
attempt to draw the evolution of  socio-economics from an analytical starting point, namely, 
trans-action [Commons: 1950, p.75]. 
We see this causation as the dynamics in which complement, mutual constraint, duplication, 
imitation, competition, and selection continuously work between trans-action, that is, the 
workings of  inter-relationships [cf., Dubouchet: 2003, p.85]. One part of  the relationships of  
trans-actions comprises horizontal relationships; other parts comprise vertical relationships. 
Therefore, cumulative causation is composed of  pluralism and hierarchy of  various citizens and 
various concerns. 
  However, if  we point out only that IE draws its politico-economic system from trans- action, 
we cannot make a judgment that IE is a unique study in the field of  institutionalism. For example, 
Théret [1992] discusses the mode of  reproduction of  severing the economic system from 
mediators, namely, law, and money. Now, with regard to the viewpoint of  trans-action, what is the 
uniqueness of  IE? It is that Commons drew a chain reaction of  the evolution of  institution and 
value in order to focus on the will in trans-action. In particular, the following two points are 
notable. First, he constructed value theory, whose subjects are dis-opportunity-value, opportunity 
cost, and negotiation. By doing so, Commons succeeded to convey that human will performs not 
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only in the choice of  opportunities but also in negotiation. Second, he clarified that collective 
actions are involved closely not only with the coordination of  proprietary scarcity but also with 
the evolution of  the content of  this value itself. Thus, cumulative causation in IE drew from 
trans-action the co-evolution of  relationships over transactions between participants, value, and 
ways of  coordination among them. 
 
5.2. CONFLICT AS A MOMENT OF PERFORMING CREATIVITY 
AND INNOVATION 
If  trans-action is set as the starting point of  analysis, it means that we start to analyze from social 
relations, that is, conflict. Modern institutionalism, in which an important theoretical element is 
conflict, is regulation theory. Boyer [1986] and Amable [2003] showed situations in which a 
politico-economic system had been stabilized for a certain period of  time from the perspective 
of  “institutionalized compromise,” which constrains the time period. Contrary to this theory, 
“conflict” in IE is seen as conflict as the moment at which creative reasoning starts, in other 
words, it is a moment of  generating new order. Conflict causes habitual assumptions, which have 
not surfaced to the conscious mind in the usual life of  actors, to become objects of  reflection. 
For example, through conflict, differences in the motivation of  the representatives of  interests 
become clear. Then, a new way emerges that, based on mutual understanding of  these differences, 
achieves consensus by utilizing the motivation of  the opposing side [Commons: 1934a, p.856]. In 
the collective investigation of  IE, this insight in the negotiation process sometimes results in the 
emergence of  an innovative institution that has a novel incentive structure for participants; then, 
the interests of  participants and workable alternatives are recomposed by the new incentive 
structure. The uniqueness of  causation in IE is that conflict is seen as a moment of  
“recompositional change” that is closely related to the evolution of  habitual assumptions, 
interests, workable alternatives, and institutions [Herrigel: 2010, p.9]; in other words, conflict is a 
moment of  performing creativity and innovation. 
 
5.3. ROLE OF WILL IN TRANS-ACTION 
The uniqueness of  IE, in particular, based on the discussion of  this article, is that “will in 
trans-actions” rather than individual will is the driving force of  the evolution of  institutions and 
value. Will performs in the negotiation process of  each transaction. Examples include the active 
meaning of  an environment, remodeling a behavioral hypothesis, withholding power and 
production at artificially high prices (see footnote 2), design of  institutions that constrain or 
sublate conflict, and deliberative collective construction of  expectation.  
IE is unique in that the composition of  cumulative causation contains possibilities in which 
the will in trans-action provides innovative consequences. Of  course, human will was not 
considered by Boyer [1988], whose analytical subject is the dynamics of  the macro economy, and 
Veblen [1899], which considered the ultra long-term cumulative change of  human nature and 
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institution. When we depart from the genealogy of  cumulative causation and view political 
economies broadly, in order to explain “gradual transformation,” historical institutionalism 
focuses on the strategies of  actors, for example, reinterpretation, conversion, and exhaustion 
[Hall and Thelen: 2009; Mahoney and Thelen: 2010; Streeck: 2009]. The focal points of  these 
works are apparently close to pragmatism because they see institutions not as given structures but 
as openings for actors’ interpretations. This interpretation of  certain institution is apparently 
related to the will of  the actor. However, their discussions are structural for the following 
reasons. 
First, the whole discussion is from a stance that captures and categorizes the structure of  
changes. This stance itself  is highly structural. 
Second, it is implicitly assumed that there are external structures outside the relationship 
between certain actors and institutions [Herrigel: 2010, p.8]. Social relationships, for example, 
political and economic power relationships around the actor, limit the actor’s type of  possible 
strategy. Social relationships that are awkward and structural establish the type of  the actor. In an 
historical institutionalist framework, there is only will as a projection of  the external structure. 
By their nature, these works of  historical institutionalism cannot depart from the viewpoint 
that structurally grasps events. To be specific, Streeck [2009] is highly pessimistic that it is or 
would be possible for collective action to change the trend of  the politico-economy in Germany. 
Pragmatists neither presume an external structure and start their analytical description from 
it, nor do they underestimate the creativity and innovation of  actors who seek to open up new 
possibilities. More radically, historical institutionalism and IE have completely different senses of  
time. The sense of  time that underpins historical institutionalism is from the past to the present, 
and to the future. In this case, there is an inevitable accentuation of  the bondage of  past, that is, 
it is structure or path dependent. However, for the participants of  IE, in order to accomplish 
future aims, the past is exposed to fresh light from the standpoint of  the present situation. This 
“past” is an accumulated form of  the past, that is, history, experiences, and institutions. From this 
viewpoint, the past is open to interpretation, and is considered as a cumulative resource that 
expands an actor’s range of  motion and possibilities. 
In cumulative causation in IE, the focus is on the will in trans-action, which is seen as the 
driving force of  evolution. For the role of  trans-action, of  course, structural operation from 
institutional totality and path dependency are considered. However, this totality and the 
experiences that have accumulated historically undergo continuous reinterpretations in the 
process of  the trans-action of  participants [Kirsch et al.: 2014, p.220, Figure 9.1; Nakahara: 2015). 
The active meaning of  the institutional totality and history is the performance of  will in 
trans-action. This cumulative causation focusing on the performance of  will in trans-action stands 
on the following belief  and way of  thinking of  Commons. First, he has strong belief  in collective 
wisdom. Second, he sees wisdom and institutions as “means” for the purpose of  controlling 
conflict and uncertainty, that is, “instrumentalism” [Commons: 1934b, p.160; Kitagawa: 2014a, 
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2014b]. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This article shows the uniqueness of  cumulative causation in J. R. Commons’s Institutional 
Economics (IE). It highlights the following three points. First, it establishes causation from the 
perspective that trans-action is kept as the focus, for both institutional change theory and value 
theory. Second, this article views conflict as a moment of  creativity and innovation, that is, a 
momentum of  institutional evolution. Conflict is an inexhaustible force of  co-evolution of  the 
relationships of  participants over transactions, value, and the working rules that coordinate them. 
Third, conflict places will in trans-action as the driver of  the evolution of  institution and value. It 
is well known that “will” is the element characterizing Commons’s evolution theory. However, in 
almost all research about Commons, the will is designated as the will of  an authoritative agency 
[e.g., Ramstad: 1990]. This article emphasizes the will performing actively in the process of  
collective investigation, that is, will in trans-action. Collective action is the regulator of  value 
theory in IE. The power that drives collective action is will in trans-action. Cumulative causation 
in IE contains the possibilities that the will in trans-action brings innovative consequences, which 
is institutional evolution. 
 In recent years, some researchers of  global management, multinational enterprises, and 
welfare states have attempted to describe organizations or politico-economic systems from the 
viewpoint of  trans-action [Herrigel: 2010; Kristensen and Lilja: 2011; Kristensen and Zeitlin: 
2005]. A few researchers of  business history, who have attempted to show the methodological 
uniqueness of  business history from the methodology of  other social sciences, have highlighted 
the viewpoint of  pragmatism [Bucheli and Wadhwani: 2014].15 Economists are now expected to 
apply the pragmatist method to the targets of  economics. This article showed that Commons’s 
cumulative causation provides the starting points for taking the first step in this new direction. 
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